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Population growth and economic change are tightly bound together. The very high rates of 
population growth in the poor countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America complicate the 
resolution of basic economic problems and make it more difficult to assure an adequate rate 
of growth of income per capita. Simultaneously, the relative stagnation of per capita incomes, 
especially in the rural areas of the very poor countries, helps to maintain high levels of 
fertility, thus completing a circle of rapid population growth and poverty. There is no one 
solution to the dilemma. Neither dramatic improvements in the standard of living nor the 
rapid adoption of fertility control are likely in the poorest countries. Moreover, population 
control by itself will certainly not solve the problem of poverty, both because population 
limitation without economic growth would merely share the poverty and because the masses 
of the population are unlikely to reduce their fertility without the prospect of some improve- 
ment in the standard of living. On the other hand, it seems to be equally clear that, 
with the exception of those few countries that are possessed of enormous wealth in the 
form of natural resources, poverty will not be eliminated without a major reduction in the 
rate of population growth. Thus, the best hope lies in some judicious combination of social 
and economic reform and population control. This solution probably implies an increased 
commitment of finance and other resources to population programs. 
The individual human beings who populate the earth are also the building blocks 
of the economic and social structure. Changes in the number and the age structure 
of a population inevitably affect the manner in which people win their livelihood 
from nature; conversely, the nature and health of the economic system have a 
powerful influence on the basic demographic processes of fertility and mortality. 
Thus, the numbers and age structure of the population and the economy are 
synergistically determined components of the same system. It is ironic, then, that 
to this date our knowledge of the relationship between economic and demographic 
variables is highly inadequate and much debated. The pervasive influence of 
population growth is a principal reason for our continuing ignorance. Almost 
every aspect of our lives is touched by the demographic context in which we live. 
Furthermore, population growth is not an insignificant quantitative phenomenon. 
Over 70 million more births than deaths are likely to occur during 1976. At this 
rate, it will only take 3 years for world population growth to generate an additional 
population equivalent to the contemporary population of the United States. 
Moreover, most of these additional people will live in the poor developing coun- 
tries of the world. 
Population growth and economic growth are interdependent, but they do not 
interact in isolation. Both spheres of human behavior are affected by and, in turn, 
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affect other areas. The political, social, psychological, and technological envi- 
ronments all interact with the economic and demographic aspects of human life. In 
much of the following discussion, we will talk of the economic demographic 
relationship in isolation. To that extent, the discussion will be misleading and may 
overstate the strength of some of the relationships discussed. At this stage in our 
knowledge, however, the opposite approach-attempting to take all’factors into 
account-would be even more inappropriate, since we just do not have sufficient 
information to relate all aspects of human life. 
The central purpose of the present essay is to catalogue the state of our know- 
ledge about the contemporary interdependency between population growth and 
economic activity in the developing countries. A secondary theme is the 
derivation of some relevant policy propositions. The treatment is, of necessity, 
brief. A much more extensive treatment can be found in the materials cited in the 
references. 
Part I of this paper deals with population growth and its components. Various 
population growth patterns are described and a taxonomy of growth patterns is 
presented. Part II deals with the economic consequences of population growth. I 
initially focus on the situation in developing countries, but the last subsection 
discusses the economic consequences of demographic patterns in the industrial 
countries of the world. Part III of the paper describes the economic determinants 
of population growth. It has been popular since the World Population Conference 
(Bucharest, 1974) to suggest that development is itself the best solution to the 
“population problem.” That proposition and the wider set of findings which re- 
lated fertility and population growth back to the prevailing structure of the 
economy are explored in detail. Part IV deals with the policy implications of the 
earlier discussion. 
I. POPULATION GROWTH 
The total number of people in a population changes as people enter the popula- 
tion through birth or in-migration or leave it through death or out-migration. 
Under most conditions in the contemporary world, migration between nations is a 
relatively minor phenomenon. Under those circumstances when migration can be 
ignored, the growth rate or the rate of natural increase of the population is defined 
as the difference between the birth rate and the death rate.’ 
The growth rates observed in the world vary a great deal. There are many 
countries in Europe in which the population is growing slowly, less than 0.5% per 
year. Other populations, largely in the developing countries, are growing at rates 
above 3% per year. To the uninitiated, these differences in growth rates may seem 
small. The implications over time, however, are mind boggling. A population 
1 The crude birth rate is the number of births occurring during a year divided by the midyear 
population and, by convention multiplied by 1,000 to avoid a small decimal. The death rate is defined 
analogously. There are, of course, many measures of fertility and mortality that are more exact and 
appropriate for some purposes than crude birth and death rates, but, for this paper, the less exact 
measures will serve. For a discussion of the alternatives, see Barclay (5). 
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growing at 0.5% per year will double in about 140 years; a population growing at 
3% per year will double in 24 years. In other words, during the time it takes one 
population to double, the other will grow by a factor of about 60. These differ- 
ences in growth rates are largely the result of fertility and mortality patterns. Some 
examples of different rates of growth and the associated birth and death rates are 
shown in Table 1. 
Caution should be exercised in comparing population growth rates. During 
1973, the birth rate of the United States was 14.9/1,000 and the death rate was 
9.4/1,000, resulting in a rate of natural increase of 5..5/1,000 or slightly more than 
0.5% per year. During the decade of 1901-1911, the population of Indiagrew at very 
nearly the same rate. Thus, the recent rate of growth of the American population 
and that of India during the early part of this century are of similar orders of 
magnitude, Yet a more-detailed examination of the demographic conditions in the 
two societies reveals them to differ in almost all other respects. Both fertility and 
mortality were much higher in the Indian population. The reason that the growth 
rates are similar is that the high fertility in the Indian population was offset by high 
mortality. Indian men and women and children were dying at a faster rate in all age 
groups than their American counterparts. It was only very high fertility which 
permitted the population to grow. Moreover, the Indian population had (and still 
has) a much younger age distribution than does the contemporary United States. 
While the former had over 40% of its population under 15, the latter has only 30% 
in those ages. Conversely, the Indian population has a much smaller proportion of 
people in the ages above 60.2 These demographic differences between the two 
countries necessarily have strong implications fcr the human condition. A popula- 
tion in which the typical child survives for only 30 years is very different from one 
in which the average child lives to the age of 70. Similarly, life patterns in a society 
in which the average woman who survives through the child-bearing years will 
have borne seven or eight children are in stark contrast to those of the United 
States, in which three children might be more typical. In short, demographic 
patterns are only imperfectly described by the growth rate of a population, and, in 
much of the following discussion, I will make reference to the component birth 
and death rates or to other demographic measures that can be used to round out 
the picture of population growth. 
There has been a considerable but geographically uneven acceleration in the 
growth rates of population during the past decades. Most of the increase in popu- 
lation growth rates is attributable to the decline in the level of mortality in the 
developing countries. With the advent of new forms of disease control, higher 
incomes, and better communication, the death rate has fallen in most of Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America. Fertility has tended to remain high and, as a result, the 
rate of growth of a population has increased to the almost unprecedented level of 
2.5 to 3.0% per year. In contrast, in a few of the developing countries, there has 
also been a fall in fertility with the consequence that population is growing at the rate 
of 1% or less per year. 
2 In contrast to what one might intuitively believe, this difference in age structure is more the result 
of the fertility differential between the two cases than it is of the mortality differential (see IO). 
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a Source: Unless otherwise stated, see “Population Index,” Vol. 40, No. 3, July 1974; per capita 
income, see “Statistical Yearbook 1974,” pp. 644-648, United Nations, New York. 
b Davis, K. “Population of India and Pakistan. ” Russell & Russell, New York, 1968. 
c Key&z, N., and Flieger, W. “World Population,” pp. 468, 485, and 500. University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1968. 
d Potter, J. The growth of population in America, 1700-1800, in “Population in History” (D.E. 
Glass and D.E.C. Eversley, Eds., pp. 667 and 672. Edward Arnold, London, 1965. 
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Table 2 shows the distribution of world population and population growth as 
estimated by the Population Reference Bureau for 1976. By historical standards, 
current world population growth rates are high, but these rates are a combination 
of unprecedentedly high rates among the poor countries of the world and un- 
usually low rates of growth among the rich countries of the world. Of the 
approximately 72 million people who will be added to the Earth’s population in 
1976, over 65 million, or the overwhelming majority, will live in the countries of 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America; these countries are, with few exceptions, poor. 
The distribution of new people among the continents is illustrated in Fig. 1. Thus, 
the economic consequences of rapid population growth are most seriously felt in 
the poor countries. This central fact provides the basis for the emphasis in this 
paper on the relationship between economic and demographic phenomena in the 
poor developing countries. 
The consequences of population growth depend very much on the form that 
growth takes. Today, there exists a whole spectrum of countries experiencing 
different patterns of population growth. To facilitate the discussion, the demo- 
graphic characteristics associated with several different types or patterns of popu- 
lation growth are presented in Table 3. Not all countries fit the suggested patterns. 
For example, preindustrial Europe did not experience fertility nearly as high as 
that of the contemporary developing countries. Also, the age structures of a 













Africa America Europe U.S.S.R. America Oceania 
FIG. 1. Project additions to total population in 1976 by major geographical regions. 
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ary United States, will differ from those associated with these ideal models. The 
four populations are, however, sufficient to describe in a general way most of the 
populations that exist in the world today. More particularly, these populations can 
be thought to represent four different stages in the evolution of a population 
from the stable condition of high fertility and high mortality.3 Note, however, 
that there is no guarantee that any such evolution will take place in the countries 
of rapid growth. Mortality rates could also return to previous high levels, or 
there could be a continuing vacillation in demographic trends. 
Type I: Traditional Underdeveloped Country 
Populations of this type have high mortality and high fertility. Life is short and 
brutal. High fertility implies that the population has a large proportion of children; in 
fact, nearly 40% of the population is less than 15 years old. On the other hand, the 
TABLE 3 




(1) Crude birth rate 
(2) Crude death rate 
(3) Rate of growth 
(percentage per year); 
3=1-2 
(4) Percentage of population 
aged 0- 14 
(5) Percentage of population 
aged 15-59 
(6) Percentage of population 
aged 60-t 
(7) Dependency ratio 
t(4 + 6)151 
(8) Average age of population 
(9) Doubling time 




38.9 44.3 26.8 20.12 
56.0 51.0 57.9 58.1 
5.1 4.7 15.3 21.8 
0.787 0.964 0.727 0.722 
24.45 22.41 33.35 38.61 
70 24 70 - 
27.5 55.0 72.5 72.5 
Type III 
Contemporary 
Type II developed 











a Source: The female West tables in “Regional Mode1 Life Tables and Stable Populations” (A. J. 
Coale and P. Demeny, Eds.). Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1966. 
3 In each case, I assume that the demographic conditions described have prevailed for some time so 
that the population corresponds to what the mathematical demographer calls a stable population. 
Under these conditions, there is no distortion of the population age structure resulting from changes in 
fertility and mortality. The demographic character of the population is assumed not to have been 
influenced by the fluctuations in mortality and fertility that are caused by the introduction of public 
health measures, war, economic depression, or any other perturbation in the social setting. Migration 
is also assumed not to exist. These assumptions may seem to be extreme, but the resulting populations 
correspond reasonably well with populations existing in the real world. 
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high mortality means that few reach old age. Many of the countries of Asia or 
Africa had this kind of demographic pattern before World War II, e.g., the popula- 
tion of India, 1901-1911, as given in Table 1. Few, if any, national populations 
have such high mortality in the contemporary world, although there may well be 
regional populations that fit the pattern. 
Type II: Modern Underdeveloped Country 
In such populations, fertility remains high, but mortality has fallen to levels 
much lower than in the Type I population. People live longer, but fertility is still 
high and, as a result, the population is growing at the very high rate of 3%/year. 
Also, as a result of the continuing high fertility, the population is very young. Most 
of the contemporary developing countries of the world have populations of this 
type (e.g., Mexico, India, or Egypt). 
Type III: Contemporary Developed Countries 
Both fertility and mortality have fallen in this kind of population. As a result, the 
population has a smaller proportion of children and a larger proportion of people 
60 years old and older. The growth rate of the population is lower than in Type II, 
but it is still high enough to double the population in 70 years. The United States 
and most of the countries of Europe had populations of this type during most of 
the 1950s and 1960s. 
Type IV: A Possible Future 
Fertility and mortality have both reached very low levels. Eventually, the popu- 
lation will cease to grow and the number of deaths each year will equal the number 
of births. As a result, the proportion of children is the lowest and that of 
older people is the highest of any of the populations discussed. The population of 
Sweden has approximated this type for some time, but a growing number of 
developed countries have birth and death rates characteristic of a replacement 
level of reproduction. They continue to grow because of the large number of 
young people in the reproductive ages, but, if present trends continue, this growth 
will cease. 
Actual populations may differ in considerable detail from the above. Any par- 
ticular country may, at different times, be characterized by the fertility and mor- 
tality of several of the types described here, and the resultant age structure will be 
a legacy of the past history of vital rates. Most of the developing countries of the 
world have changed their fertility and mortality patterns from those described 
under Type I to those of Type II, and a few seem to be moving toward the patterns 
described by Type III. They may eventually move to the Type IV pattern. 
There was a time when it was customary to discuss the movement from high 
mortality and fertility to low mortality and fertility under the heading of “demo- 
graphic transition” and to attribute major importance as a paradigm to the sequence 
of vital rates and growth characteristics (57). In particular, importance was 
attached both to the fact that mortality decline was the first change and to the as- 
sociated idea that the fertility and the mortality decline were in some way associated 
with increasing prosperity. Now it is recognized that this sequence has none of 
the properties of a natural law. There are many other possible patterns of demo- 
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graphic development. Nonetheless, there is good reason to think that popula- 
tion growth rates will eventually have to decline. The most desirable basis for 
the decline will be a reduction in the fertility to offset the mortality decline that has 
already taken place in most countries of the world. Certainly, fertility change will 
be the major goal of any population policy designed to regulate the total numbers 
of a population. Thus, it is important that, in the following discussion of the 
economic consequences of population growth, we concentrate on the economic 
consequences of changes in fertility rates. 
There are many possible responses to rapid population growth. Some of these 
reactions take the form of changes in the economic activities that people under- 
take; but people can also respond to population growth by altering their demo- 
graphic behavior or changing their psychological perspective on the world (15,18). 
There are two levels on which one can discuss the reactions to population growth. 
First, one can examine the reactions to population growth at the level of the 
individual, the family, or the village. Second, one can look at the reaction to 
population growth at the level of the society as a whole. Let us examine the range 
of possible responses for a family as its numbers grow. The working members of 
the family may work longer hours to provide for the extra members; they may 
alternatively work the same length of time, but cut back on their saving and try to 
make ends meet by consuming a higher proportion of the income that they have. 
Either the family as a whole or some of the adults could move to a new location, 
such as a city, where there might be greater opportunities for making a living. 
They could adopt new forms of production designed to get more output from the 
resources at their disposal. They could just spread the income that they have 
evenly among the various members of the family that have a claim on a share of 
the income. They might use some combination of the various possible reactions. 
People may also respond by changing their fertility behavior; for example, they 
may marry later or have fewer children within marriage. 
Reactions may go beyond the realm of the family. As populations grow, there 
will be increasing pressure on the labor market. Wage rates may not increase as 
rapidly as they would under conditions of less population growth. The common 
experience of this and other society-level problems may lead societies to 
collectively react to population growth in ways that leave little room for individual 
choice. One reaction is not possible-to do nothing. The very existence of the 
larger population forces some sort of adaptation. At the level of the society, the 
reactions will reflect the cumulative and simultaneous behavioral changes taking 
place in thousands of families. Many of the reactions will be located in the 
economic sector. These are the subject of the next section. 
II. POPULATION GROWTH AND THE ECONOMY 
A. The Contribution of Malthus 
The relationship between population growth and the development of a national 
economy has been a subject of interest and controversy since the end of the 18th 
century when Thomas Malthus wrote his polemical “Essay on Population.“4 
4 Applebaum (2) has produced a recent edition of Malthus’ work which very helpfully contains 
portions of several editions of the essay and selections from followers and critics. 
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Malthus postulated that population growth would be a function of economic 
growth; specifically, a population would continue growing unless mortality in- 
creased sufficiently to bring it in check. On the other hand, population growth, or 
rather the growth of the labor force, contributes to the growth of economic output, 
but the extra output associated with increases in the labor force is diminishing. 
Diminishing returns, in the Malthusian model, are a natural consequence of the 
fact that the supply of arable land and natural resources is fixed. Consequently, a 
time would come when population growth would have outpaced economic growth 
and brought the positive check of mortality back into play. Population growth 
would outstrip the growth in the food supply. Thus, in Malthus’ model, population 
growth is the underlying cause of this world’s misery. Such being the case, 
Malthus and at least some of his latter-day followers have argued that it is idle for 
reformers or developers to attempt to change social institutions or to spend funds 
on development, for population growth would inevitably eat up the gains. The 
tone of Malthus’ work indicates that he believed that the checks of which he spoke 
would come into force in the not too distant future. To the extent that the Malthu- 
Sian theory is essentially concerned with the short run, it has been refuted by 
much of the experience of the past two centuries. Population growth rates have 
gone up, but so has the average level of living for most of the people of the Earth. 
In contrast to Malthus, modern discussion of the relationship between popula- 
tion growth and economic development has concentrated on a more complicated 
set of interrelationships. Much stress is laid on the possible contributions of capi- 
tal formation and technological progress to the process of economic growth. 
Moreover, in the realm of policy, it is recognized by many today that institutional 
change does offer a hope for continued improvement of the human condition. For 
example, land reform and education campaigns may lead to fundamental im- 
provements in the lives of the people they reach. But, even within the new 
framework, there is some evidence that rapid population growth has adverse 
consequences for economic measures of human welfare. Thus, the debate con- 
tinues: Is the well-being of the country adversely or favorably affected by popula- 
tion growth? 
Malthus was primarily concerned with the total size of the population and its 
effect on the well-being of the nation, whereas modern discussions have been 
equally concerned with the effects of age structure on the economy. The rate of 
growth of the population is certainly important, but its effect may be largely felt 
through the age structure. For example, a high proportion of children less than age 
15 in a population indicates both that the average adult in the population will be 
providing for a large number of dependents and that the labor force will be 
growing rapidly at least until that set of children reaches maturity. Furthermore, a 
rapidly growing population tends to be very young. The Type II population is a 
good example: 44% of its population is less than 15 years of age. By way of 
contrast, children make up only 27% of the population of Type III and 20% of the 
population of Type IV. In the remaining part of this section, we review the effects 
of both population size and age structure on the economy. 
B. The Economic Consequences of Population Growth for LDCs (Less 
Developed Countries) 
In most discussions of the sources of economic growth in the developing coun- 
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tries, stress is laid on the factors which determine the productive capacity of the 
country. The term “factors of production” (e.g., labor, land, machinery) is used 
to describe the inputs that are used in the process of production. Within this 
framework, the central problem of development is thought to be increasing the 
factors of production most necessary for economic growth. It is the supply of 
factors that determines the capacity of the economy to produce the goods and 
services consumed by the public. Economists usually group the factors of produc- 
tion into categories-land, capital, labor, technology, etc. According to the capac- 
ity approach to development, economic growth results from an increase in the 
quantity or quality of the labor force, from an improvement in or an enlargement 
of the capital stock which exists in the country, or from some change in the 
manner in which capital and labor are combined in the process of production, i.e., 
in the technology of production. Population growth affects economic growth 
through its impact on the labor force, on the capital stock, and/or on the state of 
technology. 
In the following analysis, I describe what is known about the effects of popula- 
tion growth on national income-the total output of goods and services. Note that 
this measure is not the same as per capita income. Per capita income is total 
output divided by population; this implies that total output may be increasing 
while per capita income is decreasing. To anticipate, I will argue that the impact of 
population growth on total GNP will differ from country to country. In the very 
poor countries, the effect may be slightly negative, whereas, in the better situated 
countries, it may be slightly positive. On the other hand, in terms of per capita 
income, the high rates of population growth have strong negative implications for 
almost all developing nations. Thus, this distinction is important to keep in mind 
(52,54). 
In examining the effects of population growth on the economy, it is important 
that we remain clear on the underlying methodology. A statement that a particular 
rate and form of population growth have an effect on the economy at least im- 
plicitly suggests a comparison with some other growth pattern. The conclusion 
drawn depends heavily on the choice of comparison. For example, Type I and 
Type III populations both grow at the rate of 1 .O% per year; yet they differ enorm- 
ously in almost all other demographic characteristics, and the implications of 
these differences for economic growth are very important. In much of the remain- 
der of this section, when I talk about the effects of population growth, I am 
comparing the effects of the Type II pattern of growth with the effects of that of 
Type III. 
1. The quantity and quality of labor. Population growth affects both the quantity 
and quality of the labor force. The quantity of labor that is available for productive 
use in an economy depends upon three factors. First, how many people in the 
population are in the working ages? Children and the aged cannot work and thus 
should not be included in the estimation of the labor available for production. 
Second, of the population in the working ages, how many are participating in the 
labor force, i.e., how many either are working or are willing to work if they could 
find jobs? Finally, how many of the people in the working ages who are actually 
participating in the labor force are able to find work? 
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Population growth affects nearly all of the determinants of the supply of labor. 
The clearest example is the number of people who are in the working ages of the 
population. Two counteracting factors should be noted in this regard. First, in a 
rapidly growing Type II population, the people in the labor force ages constitute a 
smaller proportion of the population than in a moderately growing Type III 
population with the same total numbers. However, the rapid growth of the Type II 
population soon causes its population of labor force age to exceed that of the Type 
III population. Thus, the more rapidly growing population will eventually have 
the larger labor force. However, in the absence of a decline in fertility, that larger 
labor force will be compelled to assume the economic burden of an even larger 
number of young people in the dependent ages. 
Population growth also affects the rate and level of participation in the labor 
force. For example, high fertility in the rapidly growing population may be one 
factor encouraging low female labor force participation rates, especially among 
women who work for wages.5 Women are, for better or for worse, the customary 
custodians of children, and high and prolonged fertility means that they will have 
fewer opportunities to join the wage-labor force. Furthermore, these women will 
have had fewer opportunities for education or other experience that would in- 
crease their productivity as workers, but which would conflict with childrearing 
duties. 
There has been a protracted debate among economists as to the actual produc- 
tivity of labor in the agricultural sections of the very poor countries of Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America. A number of well-known development models have, in 
fact, been constructed on the assumption that the marginal product of labor in 
agriculture is zero or negligible and that there would be little or no economic loss 
in shifting labor from agriculture to industry in the initial stages of development 
(38,46). Empirical work has thrown doubt on this assumption (28,43). However, 
while there are few economists who believe that the marginal product of labor in 
agriculture is zero, there is an increasing presumption that it is very low and that, 
under some circumstances, it would be possible to reorganize agricultural produc- 
tion so that the same output could be obtained with fewer laborers (30,51). Reor- 
ganizing agriculture so that it allows a higher level of productivity per worker is a 
high priority. Such reorganization is extremely difficult, however, in the face of 
rapid population growth. According to Myrdal, the pressure of population growth 
leads to a tendency to reorganize economic relations so that jobs are given to all 
members of the social order, even if, in the process, the average productivity of 
labor in the system is reduced (40). Thus, one of the important effects of rapid 
population growth is to make it more difficult to significantly improve agricultural 
productivity. The discontinous improvement in agricultural technology rep- 
resented by the “Green Revolution” may help to offset this effect of rapid popula- 
tion growth. However, this new technology, unless carefully controlled to avoid 
the excessive use of labor-displacing machinery, threatens to exacerbate problems 
of income distribution and lack of jobs. 
5 The literature on female labor force participation and fertility is lengthy. A good overview is 
contained in the report by the United Nations (58, pp. 303-309). 
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The other side of the productivity coin is the problem of labor absorption. Rapid 
population growth forces the economy to accelerate the generation of employment 
opportunities for the people of labor force age who want jobs (13). Aside from the 
definitional problems of “employment” and “output,” it is possible that a consid- 
erable amount of unnecessary “work sharing” occurs within extended families 
and communities. For example, two brothers work on a farm that could yield as 
much per acre if worked by one person, or three people operate a shop which two 
could manage. In this case, it is not clear whether or not an increase in the number 
“employed” represents an increase in productive capacity. By almost any defini- 
tion of employment, however, rapid growth of the population of labor force age 
will complicate the problem of job creation, especially when meaningful and 
well-paid jobs are demanded. 
To conclude the discussion of the effects of rapid population growth on the 
quantity of labor, it is worth mentioning that the goal of providing full employment 
and increasing productivity inevitably implies that there will be a tendency for 
wages to rise. From the point of view of the policymaker, wage increases as- 
sociated with full employment and increasing labor productivity ought to be wel- 
comed as a sign of a healthy economy. From the perspective of employers, how- 
ever, rising wages threaten profits and are thus likely to be opposed by some 
elements in the business community. There may even be opposition to fertility 
reduction on the grounds that it may lead to increasing labor scarcity. A former 
prime minister of Japan was recently quoted in an Indian newspaper as explaining 
that fertility in Japan had been reduced too much, as evidenced by the growing 
scarcity of labor and rising wages. Most of the developing countries would prefer 
the problem of too many jobs and excessively high incomes for the working class 
to the current problems of scarcity and subsistence. 
Population growth also affects the quality of the labor force. Quality is more dit?i- 
cult to measure than quantity, but clearly the skill level, the motivation, and the or- 
ganization of the labor force have pronounced effects on the output that a given 
number of workers can produce (50). Very rapid rates of population growth tend 
to reduce the average educational levels of the population and probably have an 
adverse effect on obtaining the other kinds of training that help determine the 
effectiveness of the workers (31,37,59). For example, the child of a very large 
family is unlikely to have as much contact with and training from his parents as 
would a child from a smaller family. On the other hand, the effects of population 
growth on levels of motivation may be either favorable or unfavorable to 
economic growth. Under some circumstances, institutions such as the land tenure 
system that have an unfavorable effect on motivation may be strengthened by 
rapid population growth (40,41). In the face of a growing labor force and a limited 
number of employment opportunities, the institutions of society develop 
mechanisms to spread the available work and income. One of these reactions may 
be a generally less effective pattern of work. On the other extreme, writers such as 
Boserup (7) or Hirschman (29) argue that, under some circumstances, the exis- 
tence of rapid population growth makes people work more effectively just to keep 
even and that this effect may be an important factor pushing the developing 
countries to break out of their old patterns of doing things. 
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2. The supply of capital. Capital formation is the process of accumulating the 
nonhuman resources which are required in the productive process. Capital-the 
tools, machinery, buildings, roads, and stocks of raw materials-is a key element 
in the process of economic growth. How important the role of capital is relative to 
the growth of labor or technological progress is still a matter of debate (17,26). 
Learning to use existing tools better or developing more effective tools may be a 
more efficient path to development than accumulating more of the same tools. 
But, accumulation of capital, in old forms or in new, must by all accounts have an 
important role in development. New agricultural equipment and new factories are 
what hold much of the promise of higher levels of output for the future, and the 
accumulation of such tools is capital formation. Capital formation, in turn, de- 
pends on the ability of a society to economize in the use of goods and services for 
consumption and to direct what is not needed for immediate consumption into 
savings and investment. 
Population growth has important implications for the rate and form of capital 
accumulation, with saving behavior at the heart of the argument. Here again, there 
are several schools of thought. The most commonly advanced argument is that a 
rapidly growing population of the Type II variety will have more difficulty saving 
than the more moderately growing population of the Type III variety. The more 
rapidly growing population will have a much higher burden of dependency,6 de- 
fined by the proportion of people outside the labor force, and, thus, the persons 
who are working will have to devote a larger proportion of their earnings to 
providing their families with the basic requirements of life-shelter, food, and 
clothing. Accordingly, savings rates will be lower in this kind of population than in 
the more moderately growing population, and the slow rate of saving leads also to 
a low rate of capital formation. 
The counterarguments are significant. There are many possible reactions to 
population growth in addition to reduced capital formation. One possibility is that 
people may save not just a residual part of their income, but rather a targeted 
amount that may, among other purposes, be intended to pay for the education and 
other needs of their children. That is, the existence of a large proportion of 
children in the population and growing total population may press the adult mem- 
bers of the population to increase saving and, possibly, to work more intensively 
than they otherwise would. Thus, depending on the theory one chooses to es- 
pouse, it is possible to argue that population growth affects capital formation 
either positively or negatively. The debate revolves around empirical questions, 
but the fact is that there is very little evidence that will support either position. 
From data on variations in international savings rates, Leff (35) has produced 
some evidence that capital formation, or at least the rate of saving, as a function of 
the age structure. There is some corroborative evidence from studies of household 
budget behavior, but the evidence is, as yet, incomplete. Intuition and the in- 
adequate data that are available support the theory that, at least under conditions 
of great poverty, high rates of population growth affect savings adversely, but our 
6 For an overview of the dependency-hypothesis, see the report by the United Nations (58, Chapt. 
13). 
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knowledge is too incomplete to give us much faith in estimates of the magnitude of 
the effect. 
3. Technological progress. At one time, scholars and planners tended to think of 
capital formation as the driving force behind growth in the per capita output of 
goods and services. More recent statistical evidence seems to indicate that sub- 
stantially less than half of the variation in the rates of growth of per capita national 
income is explained by the rate of capital formation. Many alternative variables 
have been advanced to account for the remaining unexplained variance. Most can 
be considered to be either improvements in the factors of production-in the kind 
of capital or the quality of the labor force-or improvements in the way in which 
existing capital and labor are combined in the productive process. Both of these 
phenomena are forms of technological progress. Technological progress may be 
the chief factor determining the rate of growth of national output. What is the 
direct effect of population growth on technological progress and the indirect effect 
through technological progress on economic growth? 
The answer to that question is that little is known; tentative conclusions suggest 
that the double impact will differ greatly from one country to another and from 
one sector to another. In those countries with an industrial economy and a 
relatively well educated urban labor force, it may be that a moderate level of 
population growth increases the size of markets, encourages the adoption of more 
modern technologies, and thus improves productivity. In a poor and densely 
populated agrarian economy, on the other hand, rapid population growth may 
have the opposite effect. More farming units on a limited land area may lead to 
deterioration in the quality of the land, lower levels of labor productivity, and a 
greater aversion to the risks of innovation. Thus, it is possible to justify any one of 
several positions on the likely impact of population growth on technological 
progress depending on the precise case chosen. Boserup (7), Clark (8), Hirschman 
(29), and Simon (55) have argued, for example, that, at very early stages of 
development, population growth may force the adoption of more labor-intensive 
techniques in agriculture and thus lead to greater productivity, as occurred in the 
shift from slash-and-burn to settled agriculture. Myrdal(40) suggests that, in areas 
with high rural density, population growth may lead to lower standards of work 
effort. Each may be correct because they are referring to different cases. In the 
contemporary world of scientific specialization, it is the operationalization rather 
than the generation of new technology that may be most seriously constrained by 
the size and rate of growth of a population. For example, poor countries can 
borrow technology, but the ability to innovate may require capital and an 
educated work force as well as a more subtle but important freedom from 
immediate subsistence pressures. 
Technological adaptation hinge, in this case, on the responses of noneconomic 
institutions to rapid population growth-the family, the government, the class 
system, the universities, etc. For example, the government may concentrate its 
resources in immediate employment generation, however short term, at the 
expense of developing coherent long-run programs. Consequently, due to the 
diversion of decisionmakers and investment funds elsewhere, government inter- 
vention in technological innovation may be impeded. Thus, both directly through 
the economy and indirectly through other institutions, rapid population growth 
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affects technological progress. In situations of very rapid populaticm growth, 
resource scarcity, and poverty, that influence is likely to retard technological 
innovation and thus the growth of the GNP. 
4. A Summary of the Economic Effects of Population in LDCs. What then, on 
balance, is the effect of population growth on the factors of production and on the 
growth of total economic activity in an underdeveloped nation? If we draw our 
conclusions by comparing the Type II and the Type III populations as described 
earlier, then, initially, the proportion of the population in the labor force will be 
less in the Type II country with rapid growth, but the more rapid rate of population 
growth will soon help it to overtake the size of the labor force in the country with 
the slower rate of growth. The quality of the labor force will probably be lower in 
the rapidly growing population. The level of capital formation will probably be 
somewhat lower in the country with the higher population growth, and the rate of 
technical progress will probably also be slower. In sum, then, we would expect 
that the country with rapid population growth will derive little or no advantage in 
terms of the growth of aggregate output relative to the country in which the 
population is growing slowly. The exact result depends on the circumstances of a 
given country. In general, the poorer a country is in the initial stage and the 
fewer special resources it has, the less advantageous will be population growth. 
As mentioned before, the adverse effects of population growth are even more 
pronounced in per capita terms. 
The advantages of a low rate of population growth are even greater if we 
consider the effects of shifting the fertility patterns from those of Type II to those 
of Type III, for, during the first 15 years after the shift, the rate of growth of the 
working age population will be unaffected. Only the number of children who are 
dependents of the system will be changed. Thus, there is a period of change when 
the country, in the process of transition from one pattern to another, may enjoy 
the advantages of both worlds. 
It is important to put the arguments advanced thus far into perspective. All of 
the effects I have presented may be outweighed by other factors. Political reform 
or an improved export situation may have greater effects on a society’s pro- 
duction of goods and services per capita than will the rate of population growth. 
More-over, these factors will certainly have a more immediate effect on economic 
activity than will population growth. Any developing country which seeks to 
improve its standard of living should recognize from the start that the policies 
leading to economic growth and the policies leading to population control are not 
substitutes for each other. Population growth does have important consequences 
for economic growth, but it is only one among many such factors (45).’ 
C. The Contrasting Situation of the Developed Countries 
The situation in the developed countries contrasts sharply with that in developing 
countries. The most salient difference between the two situations is that the rate 
of population growth is on the order of three to five times greater in the developing 
countries than it is in the developed countries. In the developed countries, the 
question of population growth has tended to be raised in terms of whether or not 
’ It is interesting that the Soviet economists are very much of this view (25). 
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there should be any growth, while, in the developing countries, the debate centers 
on the question of how important it is to reduce fertility from the current very high 
levels. As a result, the problems that are associated with population growth differ 
in the two situations. For example, the chief problem in the developed countries is 
the effect of population growth on the utilization rather than on the expansion of 
capacity. 
First of all, a number of distinguished scholars have argued that the level of 
demand in the individual countries may be favorably affected by population 
growth. The low rate of population growth (in the United States) was often cited in 
the early Keynesian literature as having been a contributing cause of the depres- 
sion (27).* The argument was basically that a growing population had a built-in 
tendency to increase the level of demand. Especially, it was thought, the demand 
for child-related activities-schools, housing, etc.-would be positively affected. 
Usually, the specifics were glossed over very quickly by exponents of this posi- 
tion. There was little evidence presented to show that people who had more 
children would spend more or that the loss of expenditures on child-related con- 
sumption items might not be offset by gains in other industries in the absence of 
high rates of population growth. The Commission on Population Growth and the 
American Future (12) has recently reviewed this position, and they conclude: 
We have looked for, and have not found, any convincing economic argument for continued 
national population growth. The health of our economy does not depend on it. The vitality of 
business does not depend on it. The welfare of the average person certainly does not depend on it. 
In fact, the average person will be markedly better off in terms of traditional economic values if 
population growth follows the two-child projection rather than the three-child one. 
A second economic problem area related to population growth in the United 
States and other advanced countries is the effect that population growth is thought 
to have on the environment. It is almost trivial to observe that, in the long run, the 
United States and other developed countries will have to reduce their population 
growth rates. But the short-run impact of population growth on the environment is 
not a matter of agreement. Certainly, population growth is not the major cause of 
the air and water pollution which are such a central concern to environmentalists.9 
The guilty parties in such cases are the technology used by industry, the kind of 
consumption patterns that we have adopted, and our high level of affluence. A 
reduction in population growth will have very little immediate impact on the 
incidence of pollution. lo This is not an argument for population growth, rather, it 
is only an attempt to recognize where possible solutions might lie. Population 
growth is not the only problem of either the developed or the underdeveloped 
world, and population control will not, by itself, solve the problems of either. 
B See 58, pp. 462-163, for further references. 
9 Paul Ehrlich (20) has been the chief proponent of the view that population growth is the chief cause 
of our environmental problems. Notestein (42) presents a contrasting view. The authors of “The 
Limits to Growth” (39) reach the conclusion that population growth, among other factors, is a major 
potential problem, but the Club of Rome itself seems to be reconsidering its endorsement of these 
findings. 
lo The Commission on Population Growth and the American Future (12, Chapt. 5) has reached a 
similar conclusion. 
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An important and related question is the manner in which a reduction in the rate 
of growth of population is brought about. Should the reduction be made instan- 
taneously or should it be gradual? Frejka (23) has given a very clear answer to this 
question. If we were to attempt to reduce the population growth rate to zero 
immediately, we would create a set of very difficult demographic conditions. 
Because of the present age structure, even replacement level reproduction (i.e., 
slightly more than two children per couple) would lead to a positive growth rate 
for the next 50 to 60 years. To reach a zero growth rate with the current age 
structure, couples would have to have fewer than two children on average per 
couple. At some later time, when the reproductive cohort has declined and there 
are more deaths due to the larger number of people in the high-risk older ages, 
women would have to have more than two children to keep the population con- 
stant. These swings in fertility would, through their effects on the age structure,l’ 
create immense and, to some extent, unpredictable social problems. It is on this 
ground that many demographers and economists have cautioned against a too 
rapid move toward zero population growth. Under present circumstances, the 
point may be moot since fertility has been very near replacement levels for the 
past 3 years. 
In 1972, the Commission on Population and the American Future concluded 
that there are few, if any, problems in the United States that would be more easily 
resolved with a more rapid rate of population growth and there are many problems 
the resolution of which would be more difficult. But, as indicated by their position 
on the environmental impact of population growth, they do not feel that popula- 
tion growth is the basic cause of most contemporary problems of the United 
States. Thus, while this impartial and careful Commission sees population growth 
as having negative consequences in the United States, the problems do not seem 
to be of the same order of magnitude as those in developing countries. 
III. AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF THE DETERMINANTS OF POPULATION 
GROWTH 
My previous discussion stressed the consequences for the economy of different 
rates of population growth. However, since both mortality and fertility are af- 
fected by economic conditions, our understanding of the interdependence be- 
tween economic well-being and population growth will be incomplete without 
some consideration of the economic determinants of population growth. 
Moreover, this topic has taken on a special importance in the light of the recent 
post-Bucharest trend to view socioeconomic development and not family planning 
as the key to fertility reduction. I will examine first the effects of economic 
development on mortality and, second, the potentially more important effects on 
fertility. 
The principal explanation for the rapid rates of population growth prevailing in 
the developing countries is the fall in the death rate. On the one hand, there seems 
to be some reason to believe that changes such as diets improved by better 
I1 The past history of fertility fluctuations in the United States has already left us with a legacy of 
social and economic problems (see 19, 34). 
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communication and transport, protected water supplies, and other public health 
advances have contributed to the mortality decline, and these advances are them- 
selves the product of improved economic conditions. Thus, the improvement in 
economic conditions, through its effect on mortality, has been one of the con- 
tributing causes of the acceleration in the rate of population growth. On the other 
hand, it can be argued that the decline in the death rate is, to a large extent, a 
technological curiosity and not an economic phenomenon. The introduction of 
vaccination, malaria control, and other relatively low-cost forms of disease con- 
trol perfected in the West have been major factors in reducing mortality. These 
remedies and their application were not dependent on improved economic condi- 
tions in the recipient countries. While the decline in mortality is the result of many 
events converging in the modern era, improvements in technology alone might 
have brought about much of the decline. 
The effect of economic conditions on fertility depends on the time period under 
consideration, on the level of aggregation of the data under examination, and on a 
wide range of other conditions. It has been observed that, in the long run, fertility 
declinesI during the process of modernization from the high levels congruent with 
the old mortality patterns to new levels which, in general, permit a rate of popula- 
tion increase somewhat less than 1% per year. Or, in terms of my earlier examples, 
fertility declines from the level in the Type I and Type II populations to that in the 
Type III population. This decline has taken place in all of the presently developed 
countries and it seems to be taking place presently in some of the developing 
countries such as Korea, Costa Rica, and China. The fact of the decline is clear, 
but the origins are only partially understood. 
A country is demographically modern when both low mortality and low fertility 
have been established. What is unclear at present is whether or not those coun- 
tries that have experienced only the reduction in mortality will indeed have the 
same experience of fertility reduction which has already transpired in the de- 
veloped countries. Given the unprecedented speed of the recent mortality decline 
in the poor countries and its partially exogenous origin, the long-run pattern 
observed in the developed countries may not be repeated in developing coun- 
tries.13 Despite an improvement in the standard of living, fertility may not fall. 
More important, we do not know how long increases in per capita income can be 
maintained with the rapid rate of population growth being experienced in many of 
the currently developing countries. Thus, the seemingly painless solution to the 
problem of rapid population growth which the demographic transition paradigm 
suggests may prove to be no solution at all. This dilemma is one of the major 
reasons for attempting to introduce a population policy to reduce fertility. If 
fertility does not decline, and if economic growth is unable to maintain a pace 
I2 See the report by the United Nations (58, Chapt. 4) and the report by Coale (9). This pattern is not 
universal. There have been many situations in which development was accompanied by a rise in 
fertility. Some disease control has a positive effect on fertility (see 56), on the effects within the family, 
(see 37). 
I3 For a discussion of the difficulties developing countries will experience in seeking to duplicate the 
experience of the developed countries, see the reports by Arriaga (3) and Teitelbaum (57). 
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sufficient to provide for the rapid increase of the population, then the result may 
be either a gradual or a disastrous rise in mortality. 
The existing economic research on fertility has been characterized by an as- 
sumption that fertility is the outcome of a rational process of choice. If people are 
having many children it is either because the parents want them or because the 
alternatives to having children are unknown or worse. Fertility decisions can, in 
other words, be treated as the outcome of a decision process by which the family 
unit chooses to allocate its scarce resources among both children and other con- 
sumption choices. The number of children in the completed family represents the 
parents’ best judgment as to their relative demand for children as opposed to other 
consumption possibilities. Thus, to change fertility behavior, it is necessary to 
alter the structure of rewards and punishments associated with having children. I 
will examine three possible applications of the economic approach, differing in the 
degree of intervention they presuppose, and then will contrast them with one non- 
economic approach. 
The economic framework suggests that demographic transition can be treated 
as a historical process in which the structure of rewards as altered as economic 
development reoriented economic activity away from the “agricultural” to the 
“industrial” and the “urban.” This change in the economic orientation of the 
society leads both to a reduction in the level of child mortality (and consequently 
the number of children a family needs to achieve its desired family size) and to a 
reduction of the economic and social importance that children have in the 
lives of their parents. A conflict develops between the traditional large family and 
the new responsibilities of an urban industrial society. It is no longer possible to 
employ children directly “on the farm” or in the father’s occupation, it costs more 
to rear them, and family-building activity conflicts with other ways of using time. 
For example, a woman’s role as mother can conflict with her role as paid worker. 
Some of the pleasures that a farm family would have received from having many 
children are replaced by the wider set of consumption alternatives available in the 
urban setting. Thus, it is thought that, as these changes take place, fertility de- 
clines and leads to lower rates of population growth. According to this approach, 
access to contraceptive knowledge is not assumed to be a central problem, nor is 
government assumed to have a large direct role to play. Rather, the responsibility 
of government is to seek the most rapid possible rate of economic development. 
There are still individuals and governments that adhere to the strict interpreta- 
tion of the demographic transition model expressed above. However there is an 
increasing recognition by some economists that it may be possible to indirectly 
alter the reward structure for childbearing without transforming the entire society 
and that such a program of selective change may, through its impact on fertility, 
accelerate the rate of growth of per capita income. A number of such modifica- 
tions have been suggested. One of the most frequently advocated changes is to 
upgrade the basic status of women either through programs to encourage their 
employment outside the home or through expansion of educational opportunities. 
As women’s horizons expand, they may find childbearing relatively less gratifying 
(24). A second type of selective social change is the reduction of infant mortality. 
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An increase in the probability that a child will survive makes it possible for a 
family to achieve its family size goals with fewer births (49). It has also been 
suggested that an improvement in income distribution will help reduce fertility. As 
a larger share of the population benefits from economic development, they will 
feel a sense of participation and will be more willing to seek to improve their lot 
through all possible means, including fertility reduction (33,47). 
Any of the changes suggested above, once implemented, may indeed lead to 
major reductions in fertility. The problem is, of course, that they are very difficult 
to implement. For example, given circumstances under which it is extremely 
difficult to find jobs for men, a traditional society may not find it easy to generate 
modern jobs for women. Moreover, many of the changes that have been suggested 
are more properly viewed as goals rather than as instruments of policy. An equita- 
ble income distribution is an important stated goal of policy in many countries 
already, and it is not likely to be easier to implement just because there are some 
desirable side effects on fertility. 
A third economic proposal for altering the reward structure is the suggestion 
that parents should be given incentives for using contraception (21,32,44,48). 
India has pioneered in the use of incentives for the adoption of sterilization. A 
similar direct form of intervention is to change the rules for maternity leaves, 
educational benefits, and the tax structure so that parents are directly sanctioned 
if they have more than a stated number of children. Singapore has made use of this 
approach to fertility control during recent years. 
The above approaches to fertility tend to begin with an economic model of 
fertility behavior. An alternative, or at least a complementary approach, is pro- 
vided by traditional family planning programs. These programs begin with the 
assumption that parents are having more children than they really want, in large 
measure because they do not have access to modern contraceptives. Within the 
family planning framework, the solution is clear: assure easy access to contracep- 
tives and fertility will be reduced. This was the logic of the early family planning 
efforts to set up clinics throughout the rural areas in India. It is also the rationale 
behind the current effort by USAID to encourage experimental efforts in con- 
traceptive saturation. However, the family planning approach, in contrast to the 
economic approach, neglects the basic motivations involved in fertility decisions. 
It should be noted that one problem economists have had in justifying their 
approach to fertility has been in explaining why parents persist in maintaining high 
fertility although the society as a whole would be much better off if fertility were 
reduced. The most common resolution has been to suggest that there are exter- 
nalities involved in fertility decisions (16). By this, economists mean that not all of 
the costs or benefits of raising children are borne by the parents. Examples of 
costs borne outside the parental unit are the provision of educational and health 
services by the society at large, the displacement of new entrants to the labor 
force, and, possibly, the provision of assistance by other members of the joint 
family unit. Such cost-sharing provisions built into the social structure make it less 
costly for parents to add to their family size. Thus, there may be a real divergence 
between the costs of children to the parents and the costs to the society as a 
whole. 
A complete view of the relationship between population growth and economic 
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behavior can only be achieved by treating the two phenomena in the same con- 
text. The general form of the interaction is clear. On the one hand, the rate and 
form of population growth help to determine the capacity of the economy to 
produce desired goods and services. On the other hand, the level of economic 
activity is a major determinant of fertility and thus the rate of growth of the 
population. A number of attempts have been made in recent years to formalize the 
set of interactions in simulation models (4). The success of such modeling is 
greatly restricted by the limited availability of empirical information that could be 
used as inputs, and it is probably fair to say that these models have been used 
more as instructional devices than as instruments of research. 
IV. TOWARD A POPULATION POLICY 
What, then, is the case for population control programs in developing coun- 
tries? In the first place, the choice of a policy depends very much on the goals that 
the nation sets for itself (52). Thus far, I have concentrated my attention on the 
effects of population growth on the total amount of economic activity. This total 
could be reasonably well measured by the gross national product (GNP). The 
growth of the GNP, however, is only one of the goals of government policy. Many 
countries have shown more concern for per capita GNP (i.e., the standard of 
living defined as the total output of goods and services divided by the size of the 
population) than they have for the total. When the goals are stated in per capita 
terms, the importance of population growth comes into focus. For even if popula- 
tion growth has no effect whatsoever on the total GNP, by definition it has an 
effect on per capita GNP. A 3% rate of population growth will require a 3% growth 
of the GNP just to maintain a constant per capita GNP, and it is obvious that any 
effort to increase the GNP per capita will require either a greater rate of increase 
of the GNP or a lower rate of population increase. 
Thus, while the high rate of population increase prevailing in many of the 
developing countries probably does have a mildly adverse effect on the growth of 
the total GNP, the principal force behind the argument that policymakers should 
pay attention to population control as a means of improving living standards is that 
living standards are, by definition, in per capita terms. Thus, a reduction in popu- 
lation growth rates has its impact through the effect both on the rate of growth of 
the GNP and on the reduction in the number of people for whom that income is 
intended. 
Governments tend to have other goals of economic policy as well, one of which 
is full employment. I have already alluded to the role rapid population growth 
plays in reducing the probability that all members of the population can find 
meaningful employment. An improved distribution of income is another goal of 
economic policy that may be adversely affected by rapid population growth.14 
Another relevant policy goal may be improved health or education standards. I 
would argue that all of these goals will be reached more easily in a situation of low 
or moderate rates of population growth than they will in the situation in which the 
rate of growth is high. The major element in any population control program is 
I4 There are very different opinions on this matter. For conflicting views, see the reports by Bogue 
(6), Davis (1.5), and Freedman and Berelson (22). 
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fertility control. Migration on a large scale is not feasible. A deliberate increase in 
mortality would be unthinkable and, for many reasons, would be likely to be 
counterproductive even if it were acceptable. Consequently, fertility control pro- 
grams have been introduced in many countries of the world. 
Will such programs (14) work? The answer is, in short, that they will have some 
effect, but they take time, and, as emphasized above, they should not be thought 
of as a replacement far more direct policies to aid economic growth, but rather as 
a substantial aid in helping to achieve those ends. 
A more important question is whether or not population control programs as 
presently constituted are the most effective programs available for the money or 
whether or not they are being undertaken at the appropriate scale. The response to 
both parts of this question is less than favorable. The evidence seems to be that 
present programs are inadequate in many respects. As currently structured, they 
are hampered by administrative problems (53) and weak motivation (14,56) among 
the target population. Moreover, it can be argued that, given the immense mag- 
nitude of the problem they are designed to solve, almost all of the currently 
existing programs are constrained by lack of funds, first-rate personnel, and other 
resources. With some reform, more political support, and additional expenditure, 
they could achieve a great deal more than at present. Their impact would be 
greatly enhanced if they were combined with other effective programs of social 
and economic development. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Readers of the previous pages of this essay may want to cry “Malthusian.” 
Most of my discussion has concerned the disadvantages of population growth as it 
affects the economy. But these remarks should not lead one to the conclusion that 
population control is the principal or the only way that a country should be 
attempting to raise its standard of living. Rather, population control is an approach 
to the problem of development which conflicts to only a small extent with the 
alternative programs of industrialization and social and political reform that, in 
and of themselves, may be more important than population control. Nor should 
population growth be used as a simple screen to hide the urgent need for economic 
and social reform in many parts of the world. There has been an unfortunate 
tendency for scholars and administrators in this modem world to look for single 
solutions to problems. The problem of poverty is not likely to be resolved so 
easily. Certainly, population control itself will not be a solution. Unfortunately, it 
may also be true in some situations that industrialization and institutional reform 
will not solve the problem of poverty. 
Thus, the rapid population growth experienced in the modem era may indeed 
make it more difficult for us to achieve many of our economic goals. Under such 
circumstances, an active population policy may be one of the elements in the 
program designed to accomplish these goals. Population control programs are 
only one of the possible means to the end of a better life for mankind; they are 
hardly an end in themselves. 
Population growth is most important as a long range phenomenon and its influ- 
ence diffuses throughout the economy or the society in which it takes place. As a 
result, it is often difficult to see its effects. But, because of these characteristics, it 
FORUM: POPULATION PLANNING 27 
should not be thought that population growth is unimportant. It is also true that 
the seasons of the year change slowly and that their effects are diffused through- 
out the world of nature, but who would suggest that winter’s impact is negligible’? 
The strength of modern economics is in its ability to deal with relatively short-run 
phenomena of limited influence. Economics also has much to say about long- 
range phenomena, but, given the difficulties in testing theories about the long run, 
there is, naturally, considerably less confidence in their predictive or interpreta- 
tive strength. It would be tragic if our concern with the immediate should lead us 
to ignore the profound issues of alternative futures. 
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